If I see only Putin’s terrible handiwork in Ukraine, then Putin has won the “shock and awe” points. He’s gained a small victory. However, I think I can draw a certain hopefulness from the reasons why what seems to be Putin’s plan for conquest in Ukraine is very problematic for him and for Russia.
Putin seems to have made a number of miscalculations; part of this was underestimating the resistance to the aggression on the part of the democracies of North America and Europe. The Ukrainian adventure is actually Putin’s segue from the pandemic. He probably bet that most Westerners would be experiencing a stupefying mix, at this point, of Covid-fatigue and relief that most restrictions in most localities have been lifted. He probably bet that the price and availability of gas and diesel would be the preeminent issues by far, as people resumed more normal work and lifestyles, and traders ramped up shipments of goods, at this time of inflationary expansion of economic activity. Petroleum and natural gas exports were supposed to work to the strategic advantage of Russia, particularly in terms of leverage with governments of certain European countries that are among its major customers.
At the present time, there’s no North American or European government that’s really a weak link in the front opposing the Russian invasion. Putin is no doubt counting on cracks in that bloc, but instead, he’s galvanized it. One possibility, so far, is that Russia’s energy card could be more-or-less neutralized. A concept of a gradual program of restrictions on importing Russian oil has some support within the European Union.
Germany is in a better position to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas through a recent deal with Qatar, as well as its plan to develop its own LNG terminals. This plan is for the long term, so that Germany can gradually wean itself off Russian natural gas. Meanwhile, if Russia becomes bogged down in a stalemate in Ukraine (which would be another of Putin’s miscalculations), German citizens will have that as a continual reminder of the importance of the adjustment in energy sourcing.
If North America and Europe are cohesive and resourceful, then they can exact a high price for Putin’s aggression. One of the big questions for the future of liberalism is whether voters in the various democracies will support the concrete measures in resistance, and whether they’ll need to see some cushioning of any associated economic costs.
If I see only Putin’s terrible handiwork in Ukraine, then Putin has won the “shock and awe” points. He’s gained a small victory. However, I think I can draw a certain hopefulness from the reasons why what seems to be Putin’s plan for conquest in Ukraine is very problematic for him and for Russia.
Putin seems to have made a number of miscalculations; part of this was underestimating the resistance to the aggression on the part of the democracies of North America and Europe. The Ukrainian adventure is actually Putin’s segue from the pandemic. He probably bet that most Westerners would be experiencing a stupefying mix, at this point, of Covid-fatigue and relief that most restrictions in most localities have been lifted. He probably bet that the price and availability of gas and diesel would be the preeminent issues by far, as people resumed more normal work and lifestyles, and traders ramped up shipments of goods, at this time of inflationary expansion of economic activity. Petroleum and natural gas exports were supposed to work to the strategic advantage of Russia, particularly in terms of leverage with governments of certain European countries that are among its major customers.
At the present time, there’s no North American or European government that’s really a weak link in the front opposing the Russian invasion. Putin is no doubt counting on cracks in that bloc, but instead, he’s galvanized it. One possibility, so far, is that Russia’s energy card could be more-or-less neutralized. A concept of a gradual program of restrictions on importing Russian oil has some support within the European Union.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-support-grows-for-russia-oil-ban-for-ukraine-war-11647883376
Germany is in a better position to reduce dependence on Russian natural gas through a recent deal with Qatar, as well as its plan to develop its own LNG terminals. This plan is for the long term, so that Germany can gradually wean itself off Russian natural gas. Meanwhile, if Russia becomes bogged down in a stalemate in Ukraine (which would be another of Putin’s miscalculations), German citizens will have that as a continual reminder of the importance of the adjustment in energy sourcing.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/20/germany-gas-deal-qatar-end-energy-dependency-on-russia
If North America and Europe are cohesive and resourceful, then they can exact a high price for Putin’s aggression. One of the big questions for the future of liberalism is whether voters in the various democracies will support the concrete measures in resistance, and whether they’ll need to see some cushioning of any associated economic costs.